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Lest  the  title  of  ny talk  nlslead  you,  let  me hasten ro nodift  lt
on  trro counts.  The rtord  rrErroperr has  come to  mean,  ln  these  postwar  yesrs,
:
a  qulte  dlstlnct  geographlcal  area,  encompesslng anywhere between  slx  and
20-odd natlons,  dependlng  upon who  uses tt  and ln  what context  lt  1e enploy€d.
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llcte,  Vhen dlscusslng  lfestern  Europe, we,refer  to  the  Af  (norr t9)  countr{ee
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of  the  OpgC, a*;  we'will  ako  have tbe  occaslon  to  refer  6;$L"+*,  to  the
':  trEurope  of  the  Slxrt,  the  European  Conmunlty,
the "Federal 
Republlc  of  Germany, Italy,  Ilxembourg  and the  Netherlands.  Aleo
th€.terq  rrbalance  sheetrr ls  not  meant',so:,,rtruch  ln  the  bookkeeplng  sense as  ln
the  frsm€work  of  supply  and  demand and,  consequently,  of  the  conpetltlve
espects  of  energy.  Lastly,  perhaps,  I  should  add ,that  by  the  elegant  rprd
rrenergyJr I  a.ur  referrtrng  to  fuel  and, power.
Energy,  wlthout,dciubt,  ts  a prlme  economle,and po1ltlea1  factor'ln
the  growth  and stablllty  of  lfestern  Europe today  as  lt  ls,  lndeed,  ln  all
nodern  lndustrial{zed,  ecci.1e6lgs:.  An eqonontc,,t'nitsn'18  that  competltlon  t,"tt' ,,  '  ,''''.-r':,.:.'. --- 
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competltlve  asPectsr  {t  ls  internatlonal  even  though  natLons  may try  to:conf1ne
and control  lt  wlthln  natlonal  borders. Indeed,  thls  ls  a very  real  economlc
problem  that  has  confronted  many natlons  in recent  years.
Energy  is  no
factor.  Indeed,  it  was
less  slgnificant  in  the  affairs  of natlons  as a polltlcel
thls  lnteractlon  of  economlcs and polltlcs  ln  the
realm of  Europers most lmportant source of  energy --  coal  --  that  led  to
the  formatlon  ln  L952 ot  the  European coal  and steel  comunity.  Ibwever,  as
we have  seen Ln  the  past  18 nonths  ln  llestern  Europe,  exposure  to  the  free
play  of  market  forces  in  a Europe-wlde  market  of  165 nillion  consumers has
/atlouul  *r  /ta,t
not  transforned  coal  lnto  an ideally  conpetltlve  industry  --  e2witnessed
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b#:tle  serlous  structural  deflcieneies
anl  rb?.n7a-,.  .ag,/sa/  q
Germany and  Belgturn,  But  more  of  thls
remalnlng  ln  the  coal  economles of
/:ntraec-
specific  sltuatlon  later.
Energy  agaln  became a potent  economlc and polltlcal  argument  in
Europe  ln  1956 when the  six  nat{ons  of  the  coal  and Steel  Cornnunlty  were
conslderlng  whether  or  not  to  extend  thelr  lntegration  to  include  arr  sectors
of  thelr  economLes.  The suez  affalr  had Just  provided  drmatle  evldence
that  all  of  Europe  could  fr  r16bultitrtit  be  crlppled
by  the  whln  of  a l,llddte-3a6r  dlctator  .ueLng  o1l  e6 a pol,ltfeal  weapon,  (At
that  tlEe  some  90 Per cent of  Europers total  oll  tnports  sere paeelng through-3-
the  Suez Ganal.)
Thus  the  ldea  of  a European  Atomlc Energy Comunlty  --  Euraton ae it
has become popularly  knolxr --  suddenly  grew in  importance.  We wl1l  never  become
independent  of
start  out  olsn
energy  lmports,  acknowledged the  Er,rropeans, but  let  us  at  least
nuclear  polrer  lndustry  so  that  we wll.l  be  less  dependent  the
next  tlme  such  a crisl.s  occurs.  The argument may have been more politically
approprlate  than  economically  pragmatic.  Another  argument  seemed  to  have more
merlt:  lt  was that  at  the  present  rate  of  increasing  energy lnports,  Elrrope
would  arrlve  at  a  stage  before  1975 whereln  the  entlre  balance  of  payments
t/1  lls
sltuatlon  rmuld  be perllc  unlessnupswlng  ln  energy  lmports  couLd be  checked
at  a reasonabl_e  level.
The cost  of  power
nxrre than  ln  the  U.S.  Thus,
ln  Europe  then  was already  flve  to  l0  rnills  per  kwh
accord{ng  to
theoretically,
U.S.  and Brittsh  estlnates  of  nuclear
polter  coats,  nuelear  po\rer, could  alnost  at  once  become eompetltlve
wlth  conventlonal  poner.  That  was t,he story  in  1956 and  1957.
Today the  el.tuatlon  wlth  reepect  to  energy ln  Europe le  no less  lnportant
end no  lees  polltlcal.  But  ln  a  llttLe  uore  than  tno  years  the:outLook  hae
,ctang-ed,  radlcally.  Itre  deuand contlnues, unabated.  lut  the  eupply proepeet 'hlE'':"
.,:l:.':,  :,
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altered  baslcally.  But  before  we look  rnto  the  present
let  us  examlne a  few  comparatlve  flgures  that  will  help
discusslon  of  Europets  energy needs.
In  1958,  the  European Comnunity produced
hours of  electrlclty  --  roughly  one thlrd  our  otdn
energy sltuatlon,
orlent  us  ln  a
230  blILlon  kllowarr
electriclty  productlon
that  year.  This  contrasts  to  a per  caplta  GNp  wtthtn  the  Comrunlty
sllghtly  less  than half  that  of  rhe u.s.  Berween 1950 and 1955, at
constant  prlces,  the  GNp  of  the  comunity  lrent  up  32 7. -  much faster
than  that  of  the  U.s.  Ihrring  the  same  perlod  the  cons,rnption  of  energy
increased  by  37 %.  This  impresslve  rate  of  expanslon is  unllkely  to
a{  7,
continue.  Itrowever, even allowlng  for  a modest  h5flo annual  Lncrease  1n
the  natlonal  Lncome  of  tha  Conmunlty  ln  future  years,  and  for  about  a  .g7,
Lncrease  in  energy  output,  for  every  one per  cent  increase  ln  the  cNp,  we
can  count  uPon an  I'ncrease  ln  Europers  energy  consumptlon  of  about  75%
for  the perlod  1955-1925.
lfe  are  accustomed to  base energy  measurement, whether  oll,  coal,
gas or  ,hydro-electric,  upon a metrlc  ton  of  coal  equlvalent.  arergfuftt
the  Comunlty  tr*+{rg  cernsuned 433,gilllene  of
o-J  hec{"
195511  ft  wlff,lncreaee  that  consunptlon  flgure
tone  equlvaleat  af  *aal  1a-5-
by  some  300 nlllton  tons  tn  1n 1975 to  a  total  of
tons.
****{***
A  look  at  the  Courrunltyf s own resources
can not  be  counted  upon  to  contrlbute  to  its
between 717 and 760 nllllon
lndlcates  that  domestic prodgctlon
future  needs.  Hydrofelectrlc
potential  has been explolted  to  lts  utnost.  The production  of  coal  has
actually  decllned  and opportunitles  for  expansion are  slight,  in  fact,
given  a more stable  import  market,  especlally  for  ocean freight  rates,  it
ls  llkely  tlrat  Europets  marginal  mlnes  w111 shut  dotrn in  conslderable  numtrer
over  the  next  years.  Europets  gas  and o11  reserves  have been well  explored
and their  extent  fatrly  weLl  determlned.  These are  not  expected  to  make an
appreciable  dlfference  Ln the  domestlc  balance  sheet.
The only  lndlgtnous  source  of  rqqlp<  energy  not  yet
provenr  remalns  atomlc  poner.  Etlenne  Hlrsch,  presldent
optlnlstlcally  forecast  that  by  the  year  1990,  atornlc  energy
one  guarter  of  the  ormrunltyr  s  total  electrlclty  productlon  --
amount now prcduced  by  all  ther:nral and hydro-electrlc  power
hard  to  argue  wlth  such a  forecast  6n  the  bas{s  of  preoent
Eowever,  one  fact  about  aton{c  power |  le  reaesurlng:
and,  not  yet
has
for
the
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lt  ls  that  the  cost  per  kwh of  nuclear  power wllr  go down as reactor
technology  lmproves.  Thus the  u.s.-Euratom  Jolnt  program for  the  con-
structlon  of  power  reactors  ln  Europe uray helpTrovide  the  exerlence  that
ls  necessary  to  brlng  down operatlng  costs.  In  all  events,  even the more
cautlous  energy economlsts are  lncLlned  to  adnlt  that  nuclear  power will
be competltlve  with  cLassic  forms ln  Europe by about  f970.
*{nh**$
Ort  of  the  foregoing,  at  least  one aspect of  Europers  future  energy
situatlon  can be determined:  it  ls  that  the  Cosmrunityrs future  growth will.
depend upon imported  fuel.
In  1955'  the  Community imporred  20 per  cent  of  total  energy  requirements.
The lmport  total,  ln  hard  coal  equlvalent,  nas  125 rnlllion  metrlc  tons.  Of  thts
total,  23 nllllon  were coal,  93 m11L1on  crude o11,  and the  r.enalnder mineral-
o11  derivatlves  --  prlncipally  fuel  o11.  Three quarters  of  the  coat  came
from the  U.S.  and 90 per  cent  of  the  crude oil  came from the  M{ddle  East.
By 1975r at  least  34 per  cent  of  total  energy needs cf  uhe Comnu:rity  muet
be  lmported  from  thl,rd  eountrles.  Uslng  a conpoe{g€ftgure  baeed on  the  eo/st
of  lnported  coal  dellvered  at  Rotterdam  today  and upon the  cost  of  lnported
fuel  oll  equivalent,  we can  estlnate  that  the  comunltyrs  blll  for  energy-7-
lmports  by  1975 w111 be in  excess of  four
about  one  flfth  of  the  alrrr'rrr  total  value
all  products.
billton  dolLars.  Thts represents
present
of  Comrnunityr  s/annual irnports.of
*ffili**
Faced wlth  the  prospect  of  paylng  an annuat btrl  of  thls  magnrtude __
for  lmported  energy  --  Europe is  incllned  today  to  conslder  carefully  its
future  course  of  action.  one luraedlate  reaction  has been to  reaLLze that
fuel  and polter  represent  an economlc area  wherein  a connon European policy
rather  than  separate  natlonal  pollcles  can best  resolve  the  energy problem
for  Europe.  Thus the  Hlgh Authorlty,  executive  anr  of  the  European coal  and
tteel  comnunity,  emponered  by  Treaty  to  eoordinate  an energy policy  u  for
the  Comnunity natlons,  is  preparlng  some far-reaching  recormrendatlons based
upon a  study  conpleted  thls  year.
The most  important  conclus{on  of  the  lengthy  report  is  that  Europe can
and must  take  lnto  full  account  non-European  fuel  and porf,er resources.  This
ls  a  far  cry  from  the  situatlon  followlng  Suez when European fircre convlneed
that  masslve  lnternal  lnvestments  ln  coal  and nuclear  porrer were  lmperatlve.
A diverslty  of  sources  --  notably  the  promlslng  oi1  and natural  gas
deposlte  ln  the  sahara  and Llbyla  --  have grcatry  changed the  prcture"-8-
These dlscoverles  may mean that  oi1  to  the  extent
of  coal  equivalent  and 60 mlllion tons  egulvalent
of  150 nltllon  metrLc  tons
of  natural  gas wlll  flow  lnto
Europe by  1975 from the  sahera --  trp  flfths  of  Europers total  energy con-
eumptlon  today.
The tlbytan  and the  Saharan deposlts  do not  slgnal  Europets  abandoment
of  coal  I'nvestments lnternally.  But  lt  le  doubtful  tf  they  wll1  be made
except  for  modernlzation  and transport.  It  ls  reported  that  already  some
European economists  are  advlslng  coal  operators  'co ieke  thelr  Lnvestment
capltal  and invest  ln  energy  sources abroad.
The plethora  of  new fuel  sourees wlll  not  fi cause utltltles  to  dismiss
atomlc  pohter.  Bbt  the  changed energy  sltuatlon  now allows  them to  wait
another  few years  untll  the  atom demonstrates  that  it can compete wlth
classlcal  forms of  power on a connerclal  baeis.
The changed o11  sltuatlon  w111 nean  a gradual  lncrease  in  Europe,sd
fuel  o11  consumptlon.  Alrcady  plpe  lines  are  sproutlng  across  Europe,
ltnlctng  najor.  seaports  wlth  present  or  prospectlve  reflnery  centerg.
Europers present  reflneries  produce a relatlvely  hlgh  percentage of
the  nedlun  and  ltght  petroleun  dertvatlves  Ln reratlon  to  fuel  oll
thus  placlng  the  prlce  of  t  the  latGer  rtxt reLatlvely  hlgher  ;fls
ttan  rn,,.the,u.s.  nhere the .denend
..,,,,:i.,--"': i;,r:  -.  ,  . 
t,,  .'  i:'  ,  :
for  gaeoline
'.: :  :. and ltght  dletlllateels  proportlonately  greater.
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lfew  reflnerles  belng bullt are  deslgned,to
yield  a hlgher  ratlo  of  fuel  oil.
If  eoal  ls  going  to  survlve,  the  Study of  the  Hlgh Authorlty  irrtt
tndlcates  that  the  rigid  prlce  structure  now donlnatlng  the  industry  nust  glve  way
to  fLextblllty.  Economlsts would  Like  to  see eventually  1n lhrrope  the  same
kind  of  conpetttlon  between
polrer plants  with  multlple
fuel  o11  and coal  that  exists  in  New york  where
burnere  can  swltch  fron  one  fuel  to  another  as  the
coal-fuel  o11
(From  1950 to
price  reLationship  fluctuates  accordlng  to  market preasures.
1956, the  coal-fuel  oi1  prlce  relatronshlp  varied  between 35
and 38 cents  per  mlllion  BTUrs in  the  New  york  area.)
But  thls  courmpetitlve  situatlon  is  not  the case  Ln Europe  y:tr  yet
although disparltles  are  lessening.  I{ere lt  true,  oil  from Venezuela  under
in  E"l/tr/rp,
present market condltlons  would be competlng suceessfuLly,wlth  coal  shlpped
from  Hampton Roads.
conpet-*t{s  :_vis*ftge_nerkct--coaktn-,
BoLC@k:>
successfut
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If  and when the  Gornmon  Market  ls  able  to operate  a  freely  competltlve
energy market  wlthout  barrlers  to  coal  inports  or  other  forms  of  energy,
total  coal  consumptlon tn  the  slx  nations  muld,  by  1965, reaah a  level
of  240 milllon  metric  tone  (nuch  less  than  presentr day consunptlon)
would  be  lmported of  that  anount,  some 35 to  45 million  metrl.c  tons
and
at
conpetltlve  or
I
In  all  events,
better-than-competltlve  prlces  frorn the  un:r.ted  states,
******
the  future  competltive  positlon  of  varlous  aources
regard  as  a  fundemental  conslderatlon  for  the  orlentatlor.
for  the  European  Gommunlty.
These are  a  few of  the conslderatlons lnvolved  ln  worklng  out  a  Long
tlme,  I  have not  touched  upolz social
prlvate  o-wnershlp,  governrnent
of
energy  ln  the
the  abillty  of
by  the  cost  of
European conmunlty  wilL  be deterrnined  in  the  future  not  by
European energy  producers  to  set  the  low price  but  rather
imported  U.S.  coaL and of  fuel  ol1.  Thle,  the  Hlgh
Authorlty  economlsts
of  any energy polley
range  energy pollcy  for  Europe.  Because  of
condltlons,  Lnveetment patterns,  public  and
ettltudes  *rnd  pollctes  an-d  stl11  other  factors  that  must be welghed.
,-  11-
There  are  at  least  deflnlte  concluslons  we can make on  the  basle  of
the  evldencel  they  ere  that  Europe has  sufflclent  energy  avallable  ln
the  foreseeable  future  to  be  able  to  grow lndustrlally  at  the  hlgh  rate
that  has been  fostered  by  economlc integration.  tfhether  tt  wlLl  be
cheap and competitlve  poner  --  thus  contrl.butlng  further  to  the  pro
ductlvlty  of  Eurcpe,  depends upon  the  success of  a coordlnated  energy
pollcy.  Thls  last  achlevement  rrculd  al.so provlde  the  fullest  evidence
of  the  comuon  Marketrs  success ln  carrylng  out  a  Liberal  trade  polley.
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